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Chapter 5
Video Heads and Rewound Bodies: 
Cyborg Memories in Rodrigo 
Fresán and Alberto Fuguet
Throughout this book posthuman and cyborg realities have 
always been “about” something else, from surviving  dictatorship 
to not surviving in neoliberalism. In this final chapter I exam-
ine a series of articulations of the posthuman that are merely 
what they are, cyborged subjectivities constructing “like” places 
to inhabit without much reflection on what caused their appear-
ance. The posthumans that appear in the novels of Rodrigo 
Fresán and Alberto Fuguet appear as remarkable and unremark-
able bodies existing within glocal matrices in highly individual-
ized attempts to construct meaning. In so doing and being, 
these bodies appear in sharp contrast to the politicized posthu-
mans that occupy Fresán and Fuguet’s literary compatriot Paz 
Soldán’s narrative. The figures that flit through Mantra (2001) 
and Por favor, rebobinar (1998) appear as the realities of the 
age, they are posthuman because there is not another way to be 
and are  interested in the construction of memories and mythol-
ogies that explain an existence not obviously marked by  political 
trauma.
By making this argument I situate these novels within the 
sometimes ferocious criticism leveled at Fuguet’s McOndo 
movement, criticisms that left Fuguet unwilling to republish 
the anthology of short stories that gave the group its name and 
that included work by Fresán and Paz Soldán among various 
twenty- and thirty-something male writers from Latin America 
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and Spain. The writers embraced, or appeared to embrace, the 
then new global realities of 1990s neoliberal Latin America, 
rebelling against stereotypes of Latin America as rural and 
magical as well as against traditions of committed political 
 narrative. Such a characterization led to much of the criticism of 
the movement, with other critics and writers offended by the 
call to move on from the narratives and themes that examine 
and review the trauma of the dictatorships and postdictator-
ships found in many Latin American countries.1 Most of the 
authors who have been associated with McOndo (principally 
because they published a story in the anthology) have, however, 
included the themes of global culture, new technology, and a 
highly developed individualism that have been rejected in some 
circles. Because of the interest in precisely these themes we also 
see various articulations of posthuman identity, as previous 
analysis in this book has hopefully made clear. Paz Soldán’s 
focus on new technologies and the posthuman acts as one 
 particularly potent argument against those that would dismiss 
the McOndo writers as apolitical or as guilty of assent by 
silence.
As I suggested earlier, the cases of Rodrigo Fresán and 
Alberto Fuguet provide another perspective to Latin American 
posthuman identity. In both Mantra and Por favor, rebobinar, 
we see articulations of posthuman identity that begin with the 
cyborg reality of technological bodies and then situate them 
not within a history of dictatorship or a present of political and 
economic abuses but as a reality that requires new mythologies 
and different ways of remembering individual experience. What 
these novels show in the context of the present study is the 
extent to which posthuman realities have become integrated 
within Latin American narrative and cultural expression, 
beyond narrative genre and beyond social and political ideolo-
gies, and how the cyborg body has gained traction as an impor-
tant vehicle for the exploration of a variety of sometimes 
competing ideas and themes.
Mantra is part of the Mondadori series Año 0 where various 
novelists were asked to write novels about, and I quote from the 
series description, “algunas de las ciudades más importantes 
del mundo” [some of the most important cities in the world]. 
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Fresán chooses Mexico City, following the example of his friend 
and mentor Roberto Bolaño’s award-winning novel Los detec-
tives salvajes [The Savage Detectives]. Fresán’s novel presents a 
series of interwoven narratives, narrated in first person by vari-
ous characters. In the first, Martín Mantra’s childhood friend, 
who came to Mexico City as a young Argentine during the 
1970s, reflects on his experiences with Mantra as he comes to 
terms with a brain tumor that looks, to him, like a “sea  monkey,” 
a reference to the comic book ads the two read when they were 
young. In the second, a new narrator, this time French, is a 
cadaver who is reminiscing as his body is expatriated from 
Mexico to France. In the last, a robot from the future searches 
among the ruins of Mexico City for evidence of Mantrax, now 
an historical figure and near deity. Throughout all the narra-
tives we see a series of attempts to understand culture, both 
Mexican and global, as the conglomeration of popular dis-
courses and especially television and film. Edmundo Paz Soldán 
has characterized the novel in this way: “Mantra . . . se anima a 
explorar qué es lo que ocurre a la psiquis del individuo, y al 
género novelístico, cuando estos son sometidos a una descarga 
múltiple y continua de información a través de medios como el 
cine, las revistas y, por supuesto, la televisión” (108) [Mantra 
explores what it is that happens to the psyche of the individual 
and the genre of the novel when they are subjected to a multiple 
and continuous download of information through media such 
as film, magazines, and, of course, television]. I would argue 
that as a function of this exploration of mass-media culture we 
find a literary reconfiguration of the cyborg figure that  displaces 
it from its tortured position in the Argentine literary tradition 
and resituates it as the basis for the construction of a new 
 cultural imaginary. What we see is an attempt to imagine a new 
mythology, a new set of stories, that explains the posthuman 
fusion of organic flesh and technological apparatus that consti-
tutes subjectivity in the novel.
At this point in our study, it seems appropriate to stir in 
 theories of being and media that we find in Marshall McLuhan’s 
work. As we do so we follow on theorizations of the posthuman 
that we explored in Courtoisie’s narrative, but this time with 
more of a focus on those subjectivities that function ably within 
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the media-based imaginaries rather than those that fail to 
 integrate (as was so evident in the case of Tajos). To arrive at this 
quotidian fusion of mass media and the posthuman, we begin 
with Haraway’s revolutionary mode of cyborg identity, we con-
tinue through the evolutionary process that Hayles describes, 
and end in a state of posthumanity so ubiquitous as to seek a 
theoretical grounding in a theorist who used media and iden-
tity theory not so much to describe what will happen or what is 
about to happen but rather to describe what has already hap-
pened. McLuhan brings (or actually brought, well before the 
work of Hayles and Haraway) the idea that this type of identity 
appears especially when humans and the technological delivery 
systems of the mass media share “informational patterns” and 
televisions and cameras function as fundamental prostheses for 
identity. These “new organs,” according to McLuhan’s Laws of 
Media, constitute real extensions of a human identity config-
ured in the fusion between human body and technological 
media apparatus (96–97).
The narrator with the sea-monkey tumor suggests, near the 
beginning of the novel, a new way to conceive of memory and 
biography. He muses:
En el futuro todos seremos directores de cine, todos filmaremos 
películas de nuestras vidas. Pienso en una mañana cinematográ-
ficamente autobiograforme. . . . 
El olvido será olvidado y ya no sabremos lo que es la memoria ni 
sus deformaciones que todo lo complican. Ya no recordaremos 
nuestro pasado como si fuera una película, porque nuestro 
 pasado será una película de la que seremos primero  protagonistas 
para poder ser espectadores después. (67)
In the future we will all be film directors, we will all make films 
of our lives. I am thinking of a tomorrow cinematographically 
autobiograformed. . . . Forgetting will be forgotten and we will 
no longer know what memory is nor its deformations that com-
plicate everything. We will no longer remember our past as if it 
were a film, because our past will be a film in which we will first 
be protagonists in order to then become spectators.
The dynamic here is intriguing, not only for the idea of lives as 
literal films but for the way that the idea is presented as a  solution 
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for organic failure. The act of forgetting is presented as a 
 malfunction of memory; a concept inherently flawed in and of 
itself as it constitutes an act that deforms the past instead of 
documenting it. As a solution to those failures, film serves as a 
prosthetic brain that stores faithfully recorded images and 
sounds of the past. But not only do we see a reconfiguration of 
the human body as both organic and mechanical, possessing 
human life and the mechanical ability to record and store audio-
visual data, we also see a multiplication of identity that further 
erodes the idea of a single human subject. The human is simul-
taneously a writer, actor, and director in this new situation, and 
is then converted into spectator when accessing the celluloid 
memories that the filmic life has produced.
The novel follows this line of thinking to its logical conclu-
sions in the figure of Martín Mantra, the namesake of the novel 
though never a narrator. In a subsequent section, the boy makes 
an appearance as the dead narrator remembers meeting him for 
the first time:
Se abre una puerta y entonces entra un niño raro, con una cabeza 
enorme que se mueve al caminar, como si apenas estuviera 
pegada al cuerpo. Al acercarse me doy cuenta que no es exacta-
mente su cabeza sino un gigantesco casco con luces y lentes de 
filmadora con luces parpadeantes lo que le hace parecer deforme 
y extra-terrestre. Hace mucho ruido. Adentro de todo eso  sonríe 
su cabecita. El niño me enfoca y sonríe. “Siempre quise conocer 
a alguien enmascaradamente luchadoriforme,” me dice. (202)
A door opens and a strange boy enters, with an enormous head 
that moves as he walks, as if it were barely attached to his body. 
As he approaches me, I realize that it isn’t exactly his head, it’s a 
giant helmet with lights and film lenses with blinking lights 
that make him seem deformed and alien. It makes a lot of noise. 
Inside all of this, his little head smiles. The boy focuses on 
me and smiles. “I always wanted to meet someone maskedly 
 wrestlerformed” he says.
Mantra is the future that our sea-monkey narrator foresaw, a 
person who constantly films what he lives and who does so 
thanks to the technological apparatus that he constantly wears. 
Note how this narrator’s reactions to the boy confirm the 
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 posthuman nature of the relationship between child and media-
prosthesis. The helmet is first interpreted as an odd, but organic, 
head. It is only upon closer inspection that differences between 
the helmet and the boy are made clear. Nevertheless, Mantra’s 
behavior is described as based on technology. His helmet makes 
him, all of him, differently formed, even alien, and when he 
looks at the narrator he does not merely look; he focuses: his 
attention and his shot-selection process are one and the same.
The dead narrator was a masked luchador [wrestler], and 
Mantra’s fascination with that particular aspect helps us appre-
ciate the service to which these posthuman images are put in 
the novel. While the man that reads the boy as alien does not 
share the same bio-technological configuration, Mantra does 
perceive an identity that extends beyond the organic. The boy’s 
description of the narrator as “enmascaradamente luchadori-
forme” names the man both as his profession and as his mask, 
elements that are prosthetic to the person’s identity. Furthermore, 
the way in which Mantra takes two nouns, “máscara” and 
“luchador” and adverbizes or adjectivizes them suggests a 
 subjectivity based on process rather than location. The combi-
nation of this kind of identity in flux between costume, techno-
logical prosthesis, and human body adds to the posthuman 
imaginary that is presented throughout the novel as it simulta-
neously relates it to Mexican popular culture and particularly to 
the successful Santos and Blue Demon films.
It is at this point that we appreciate the other thrust of the 
novel when it comes to the presentation of new kinds of human 
beings: that is, the attempt to rewrite mythology so as to include 
a genesis story of the posthumans and televisual cyborgs that 
populate a modern Mexico perceived by foreign eyes. The 
 section of the novel devoted to the dead French wrestler begins 
with “Así, creo yo, es como empiezan las mejores religiones” 
and continues with a series of musings about the importance of 
science fiction for the creation of a national identity, with 
emphasis on the importance of Rod Serling’s The Twilight Zone. 
These musings are especially revealing as they intersect with 
Mexican history. At one point, we see a recital of the conquest 
of Mexico that culminates in a series of descriptions of maps 
and of their study. As the stream of consciousness connections 
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build, we find the following series of historical figures engaged 
in cartographic contemplation:
Retratos de personas mirando mapas: Julio César, Hernán 
Cortés, Napoleón, Adolf Hitler, Darth Vader. . . . Hay algo de 
conquistador en todo aquel que mira un mapa (al mirar un mapa 
miramos desde las alturas de un dios) y hay algo de conquista-
dor también en la primera vez que miramos mapa de la isla del 
Tesoro (trazado por Robert Louis Stevenson a partir del 
 contorno de un estanque en una plaza frente a su casa en 
Edimburgo) o de la Tierra Media (porque J.R.R. Tolkien neces-
itaba todo un mundo donde poner el idioma que venía 
inventando desde los ocho años). (245)
Portraits of people looking at maps: Julius Caesar, Hernando 
Cortés, Napoleon, Adolph Hitler, Darth Vader. . . . There is 
something of conqueror in anyone that looks at a map (when we 
look at a map, we look from the perspective of a god) and there 
is something of a conqueror in us the first time we look at a map 
of Treasure Island (drawn by Robert Louis Stevenson by the 
side of a pond in a park in front of his house in Edinburgh) or 
of Middle Earth (because J.R.R. Tolkien needed an entire world 
in which he could put the language that he had been inventing 
since he was eight years old.
By situating these ruminations at the end of a long recounting 
of Mexican history and by including Hernán Cortés and 
 “conquistador” in the passage, we see a juxtaposition of the 
staples of Mexican history with important figures of Western 
history and, of course, Darth Vader. The fact that we, as read-
ers, ape Caesar and Cortés when we look at maps of Treasure 
Island and Middle Earth underscores the way in which the 
 popular culture that feeds our childhoods contributes to the 
formation of this kind of hybridized identity, one made cyber-
netic not only by the heavily cyborged figures that populate 
Mantra but also by the fact that our list of historical figures 
culminates in Darth Vader, popular culture’s best known 
cyborg. By sensing the presence of the infamous conquerors in 
the list in the construction of Vader and combining that with 
the fact that Darth Vader’s dependence on a mask makes him, 
unwittingly, especially appropriate for adoption into a Mexican 
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mythological imaginary, we see how Fresán suggests a new 
popular mythology that generates the cybernetic figures that 
run through the novel.
The novel’s end, a robot’s search for his origin, brings all of 
these threads into another hybrid whole. This section begins as 
follows:
He aquí el relato que solían relatar los viejos:
«En un cierto tiempo que ya nadie puede contar, del que ya 
nadie puede acordarse . . . un día llegó caminando un hombre 
que se decía mitad momia y mitad metal a “Mexico City is 
known to Mexicans simple as México—pronounced ‘MEH-
kee-ko.’ If they want to distinguish from Mexico the country 
they call it either ‘la ciudad de México’ or el DF—‘el de 
EFF-e’ ”».
Era un hombre extraño. (513)
Behold the tale that the elders used to tell.
“In a time that none can now count, that none can 
 remember . . . one day a man came walking that was said to be 
half mummy and half metal to ‘Mexico City is known to 
Mexicans simple as México—pronounced ‘MEH-kee-ko.’’ If 
they want to distinguish from Mexico the country they call it 
either ‘la  ciudad de México’ or el DF—‘el de EFF-e.’ ”
He was a strange man.
At this point the novel has become myth (the passage in English 
is mentioned repeatedly throughout the novel), and we see how 
the cyborg image has combined with passages from the narra-
tive to create the mythology of Mantrax, the god that the robot 
seeks. In so doing, the novel invites a comparison between the 
grafting and editing that occurs as history and story are fused 
in myth, as organic flesh and technological prosthesis are fused 
in cyborg, and as disparate scenes are cut together in film. 
Indeed, the narrative structure that moves us from a young, 
dying man, to a corpse, to a robot, outlines the evolution of the 
posthuman. Mantra as a novel sees in the cyborg a body pecu-
liarly prepared to mediate and explore that process, one whose 
essential hybridity and fused nature helps understand identity 
and myth in the media age.
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By so doing, we see a reimagination of the cyborg figure in 
Argentine narrative (this is another graft of sorts, it feels odd, 
and necessarily so, to read this as an Argentine novel though it 
is by the writer whose earlier work includes Historia argentina). 
Because of this reimagination, I think we need to be careful of 
reading this as merely a novel about what happens when you 
watch too much TV. For example, Edmundo Paz Soldán has 
observed that,
Rodrigo Fresán explora en Mantra la intensa relación que existe 
entre el hombre y los artefactos tecnológicos en la sociedad 
 contemporánea. Gracias a su relación con la máquina (en este 
caso, la televisión), el ser humano pierde agencia, se convierte en 
parte de los procesos de intercambio de una sociedad capitalista 
y globalizada. (2003: 106)
In Mantra, Rodrigo Fresán explores the intense relationship 
that exists between man and technological artifacts in contem-
porary society. Thanks to their relationship with machines (in 
this case television), human beings lose agency and are  converted 
into a part of the processes of exchange of a globalized,  capitalist 
society.
While I completely agree that the novel examines this intense 
relationship, articulating new identities that arise from that 
communication of information between body and mass-media 
machine, I would argue, however, that the novel goes much 
further than simply describing the dehumanizing effect of that 
relationship. Instead, Fresán takes the intimate interactions 
between human and television to posit a new kind of globalized 
body, one that is neither dehumanized nor rehumanized, but 
posthumanized. In so doing, he reconfigures the Argentine 
cyborg from unholy monster or scarred survivor to citizen of a 
new global culture in need of a new, cybernetic, mythology.
Fresán presents another vision of this globalized, cyberneti-
cized culture in his short story “Señales captadas en el corazón 
de una fiesta” [Signals Captured in the Heart of a Party]—this 
time on a scale less grand than that of new mythologies and 
future civilizations. The story, published in Fresán’s collection 
La velocidad de las cosas (1998) [The Speed of Things], earlier 
served as Fresán’s contribution to the McOndo anthology. In it, 
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we find a series of reflections on what it means to be a “party 
animal,” with considerations of popular music (David Byrne, 
The Pet Shop Boys) as well as drug culture and dealing with 
AIDS. The narrator functions as a collector of voices and 
thoughts that occur at parties, reporting snippets of conversa-
tions and situations that are overheard as one moves through 
the dialogues that constitute the series of parties that is one 
never-ending party.
The story begins with a first-person narrator musing on the 
titular signals:
Aquí están, estas son, las señales captadas en el corazón de una 
fiesta. Las metálicas y frías señales. El derrotado himno de 
batalla, la triunfante marcha fúnebre, los sombreros en la 
mano.
Me gusta oír las señales. La cabeza ligeramente torcida sobre un 
cuello que apenas la sostiene. Sísifo separa unas de otras con 
cuidado, las ordena por color y por peso, y en seguida empuja y 
sigue empujando montaña arriba. (65)
Here they are, these are the signals captured at the heart of a 
party. The cold and metallic signals. The defeated battle hymn, 
the triumphant funeral march with hats in hand.
I like to hear the signals. The head lightly twisted on a neck that 
can barely keep it up. Sisyphus separates them carefully, puts 
them in order by color and weight and then pushes and keeps 
pushing them up the mountain.
The accumulation of organic and metallic body parts here is 
impressive. The heart of the party gives way to the receptor of 
signals, in this case a head too big for its body that appears to 
presage Martín Mantra’s headgear. Fresán intercuts the list of 
body parts with signals, suggesting a mechanical nature to this 
biologically described party—signals that are particularly tech-
nological given their cold metallic nature. As the signal collec-
tor, a grotesque body, is able to listen to these mechanical 
signals, we see quite clearly the kind of relational dynamics that 
constitute the posthuman identity for which Hayles argues. 
While the party and its participants are biological, with bodies 
and organs, the messages that circulate among these bodies are 
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mechanical—making not only the narrator’s body but also the 
party itself a truly cybernetic organism. As the story continues 
the narrator makes frequent reference to the signals, sometimes 
as “latidos digitales” [digital heartbeats] of the aforementioned 
heart of the party; at other times as more traditional radio 
 signals that are broadcast and then lost in the ether. In all cases, 
we see the development of a discourse of the technological as a 
way to describe the supposedly organic system of parties.
These parties appear as the cause of the metaphorical trans-
formation of human to cybernetic partygoer. The narrator 
explains his particular power as radio receiver, “Me refiero a 
aquellas señales que sólo puede captar alguien para quien las 
fiestas han dejado de ser interesantes. Ese al que las fiestas ya 
nunca le resultarán dignas de interés salvo para compararlas con 
las otras fiestas” [I refer to those signals that can only be picked 
up by someone for whom parties have ceased to be interesting. 
He for whom parties will never be interesting except as they are 
compared with the other parties] (65). This boredom with the 
party culture is what attunes the narrator’s receptors and quali-
fies him to receive the titular party signals. This process extends 
beyond the auditory nature of radio signals and converts the 
narrator into a radio/camera/television watcher as the story 
progresses:
Miro las fiestas como si fueran cuadros. Las miro y las fijo en el 
negativo invertido de mi retina cansada. Basta que cierre los 
ojos para sentir que las fiestas comienzan a desaparecer del 
mismo modo en que yo, con la siempre elegante lentitud de lo 
inexorable, he ido desapareciendo para el resto de los concurr-
entes, que ahora prefieren mirar para otro lado antes que 
 concentrarse en el hombre invisible . . . 
Si, es posible que me hayan visto hace poco en los bordes de 
alguna fiesta, apartando enseguida la mirada—otro cuadro—, 
negando mi existencia como se niega una noticia desagradable 
al cambiar de canal. Zapping. (66)
I look at parties as if they were paintings. I look at them and fix 
them in the inverted negative of my tired retina. It suffices to 
close my eyes to feel that the parties begin to disappear the same 
way that I, with the always elegant slowness of the inexorable, 
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have been disappearing for the rest of the partygoers, who now 
prefer to look away than to concentrate on the invisible man.
Yes, it is possible that they have seen me on the edge of some 
party, looking away very quickly—another painting—, denying 
my existence like one denies bad news by changing the channel. 
Zapping.
The narrator does not merely receive the conversations and 
sounds of the party as signals; he also captures the images, his 
tired retina is described in its camera-like functions as he looks 
and fixes each scene, recording it as he did the overheard sounds. 
This process erases him as a man, making him invisible but also 
converting him into television. That is, his ability to receive 
 signals makes him more akin to the quotidian device that also 
receives and fixes image and sound. For that reason, the logical 
response to the narrator at parties is “zapping”; that is, the 
other partygoers change him as they would a channel.
This combination of party as cybernetic organism and party-
goer as human television suggests the development of a posthu-
man society that Fresán would use Mantra to mythologize. 
Furthermore, the story employs this cybernetic discourse as 
merely a semiotic system for describing the human condition. 
That it, to this point in the story, the technological imagery is 
not explicit or literal as we saw in Mantra; it merely functions as 
the most appropriate way to express the condition that the 
 narrator seeks to describe.
However, the story takes a supernatural turn at the end, 
when we discover that the narrator is actually a ghost, the spirit 
of a man who has died of AIDS and continues to frequent the 
parties that he had attended when alive. While the spirit  suggests 
a more fantastic arrangement than the implied science  fiction of 
the technological metaphors, Fresán quickly resituates his ghost 
story within a cyborg matrix. As the narrator adopts the dead 
Willi’s voice, he encounters first a deformed girl—una de ellas 
parece macrocefálica, una cabeza inmensa sobre un cuerpito 
delgado (89) [one of them seems macrocephalic, an immense 
head on a thin tiny body]—in reality a girl wearing a Teenage 
Mutant Ninja Turtle costume. The combination of animal and 
human, and especially the oversized head, both anticipates the 
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wrestler’s reaction to Mantra as it simultaneously emphasizes 
Haraway’s inclusion of human/animal couplings as an element 
of cyborg identity. Willi then remembers his death, a collapse 
that happens as his parents play a game based on Morse code 
that mirrors Willi’s conversion from flesh to transmission, his 
spirit sending signals through the Ouija board that serves as a 
fixture in the parties he attended. This image culminates in 
Willi’s final messages: “Me muero. Me despido. Cambio y fuera. 
Fin de transmisión” (90) [I’m dying, I say goodbye. Over and 
out. End of transmission].
The story ends with more reflections from the dead Willi, 
who appears to exist because of the series of films that were 
made of him and his family before he passed away. Fresán again 
(or rather, first) works through the themes of memory as film 
and of the reality of the past as that which is recorded on 
 celluloid. Willi’s afterlife is proscribed by his continued exis-
tence as a visual and audio signal, as the digital and analog 
reproduction of his once organic life. Among other themes the 
story presents a reflection on the role of technology in the pres-
ervation of life and the necessary conversion of organic life into 
television signal, a conversion that he would then mythologize 
in Mantra.
From the rather grand gestures we find in Mantra and the 
supernatural “Señales” that anticipated Fresán’s novel, we move 
to smaller, more personalized movements in Alberto Fuguet’s 
popular novel Por favor, rebobinar, a novel whose title was so 
grounded in the video culture of the 1990s that it has already 
become obsolete (as we no longer rewind DVDs or computer 
files). The novel, a series of meditations, reviews, interviews, 
and stories based on the lives of a group of twenty-something 
middle-class Chileans, is replete with the mass media made 
 evident in the “Be kind, rewind” instructions of the title. Film, 
television, radio, newspapers, and magazines all provide the 
material that constitutes the lives of this young Chilean middle 
class at the beginning of the post-Pinochet era. This focus on 
mass media in the novel helped define the McOndo moment, as 
I noted earlier, and has also given a focus to the majority of the 
criticism that has been written about Fuguet’s narrative. What 
this criticism has missed is the relationship between mass media 
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and technological identity that becomes clear only in the 
 consideration of the posthuman characters that appear in the 
novel. These posthumans are not, however, the camera-headed 
filmmakers and origin-seeking robots of Mantra; the closest 
these characters get to the science fiction denizens of Fresán’s 
world is by watching the same movies that Mantra and his 
cohort watched. Nevertheless, we find a series of moments 
where Fuguet’s characters can only express their experiences in 
posthuman terms; the mass media world that they inhabit has 
reconfigured them as consciousnesses dependent upon pros-
thetic imagery for the articulation of self.
The majority of criticism dedicated to Por favor, rebobinar 
has looked specifically at the Lucas, the aspiring film critic who 
lives through the films that he watches—principally videotapes 
that he rents. Over the course of his narration, he indicates that 
he best understands his life as a film and that his memories and 
his interaction with the world make most sense when taken as 
elements of a script. This positioning of subjectivity within a 
cinematic matrix helps set up a series of articulations of a 
 posthuman-like identity, where a pronounced identification 
with film bleeds into a body configured by the technological 
tools used to make that film.
Así, creo, funciona un poco mi mente: más que creer que los 
ojos de Dios siempre me están mirando, siento que lo que tengo 
dentro del cerebro, conectado a los ojos, es una cámara que 
registra cada uno de mis actos. Creo que cuando uno se muere, 
se va a un gran microcine que está en el cielo y, junto a un 
comité ad hoc, uno se sienta a ver lo que ya vio.
Eso se llama el infierno.
Algunos, supongo, creen que es el cielo. (19)
That, I believe, is a little like how my mind works: rather than 
believe that the eyes of God are always watching me, I feel like 
what I have inside my brain, connected to my eyes, is a camera 
that records each of my acts. I believe that when someone dies, 
they go to the great theater in the sky and, with an ad hoc 
 committee, one sits and sees what they already saw. That is hell. 
Some, I suppose, believe that it’s heaven.
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A couple of pages later, he remarks:
Soy un maestro del zapping, de la cultura de la apropiación. 
Digamos que afano, pirateo, robo sin querer. Es como si tuviera 
un digital sampler en mi mente que funcionara a partir de puras 
imágenes. No soy un tipo creativo. No invento, absorbo. 
Trago. (22)
I am a master of zapping, of the culture of appropriation. Let’s 
say that I steal, I pirate, I rob without meaning to. It’s as though 
I had a digital sampler in my mind that functions with pure 
images. I’m not a creative type, I don’t invent, I absorb, I 
 swallow.
Ana María Amar Sánchez’s take on these passages is that they 
form the manifest of the novel, that with Lucas’s absorption of 
popular culture we see a narrative cannibalization of the novel 
as just one more artifact of the same pop-culture system of 
 representation (210). What I would propose as an extension of 
the critical consideration of the novel and of Lucas specifically 
is the way in which Lucas’s attempts to articulate his own 
 subjectivity result in an elaboration of a posthuman body where 
memory is able to occur as well as the sociocultural implications 
of such a body.
In the first passage, we observe a dynamic between  technology 
and flesh, surveillance and behavior. In Lucas’s mass media 
world, the camera functions on several levels. At first, we see a 
connection between a god that controls all humans’ actions, a 
kind of superego/Panopticon that disciplines the organic body 
by means of constant surveillance. Lucas then modernizes the 
religious overtones of his musings, transforming “los ojos de 
Dios” into a camera, a technological device that fulfills the 
same function as the divine—therefore configuring a mass media 
world where celluloid is the creator/judge. Notwithstanding 
the metaphysical implications of such a transformation, what 
interests me most in this passage is the insertion of the camera 
into Lucas’s head. Lucas combines the final judgment story 
with a cybernetic image, one in which his brain becomes cyborg 
as his cerebral memory centers are configured as a camera that 
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records. In that moment, Lucas’s organic body ceases to exist 
separately from the film technology with which he has inter-
acted for so long. In this sense, Lucas’s lifestyle has contami-
nated his sense of self profoundly. If we follow (and bend) the 
implications of the film and television theory associated with 
suture and flow to their cybernetic ends we find that the specta-
tors are programmed by their experience with mass media to 
conceive of themselves as cameras, constantly seeing and record-
ing the world through the eyes of that machine. In the case of 
Lucas, his long relationship with his television has trained him 
to experience the world as a camera would. On this level, it is 
not important that Lucas is not a literal cyborg like those we see 
in more traditional science fiction (though we should recognize 
that Lucas cites films from science fiction frequently). What is 
important is that Lucas no longer conceives of himself as sepa-
rate from his prosthetic memory machine. What we see is a shift 
in thinking that follows the last portion of Katherine Hayles’s 
description of posthuman thinking that I cited earlier: “In the 
posthuman, there are no essential differences or absolute demar-
cations between bodily existence and computer simulation, 
cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology 
and human goals” (3). Lucas, as he constructs an identity based 
on cybernetic prosthesis and, in particular, presents his ability 
to interact with reality as based on that same prosthesis, also 
presents himself as a part of the evolving “posthuman view.”
Regarding the second passage (about zapping), Lucas’s tech-
nological absorption develops his posthuman identity in various 
directions. He repeats the idea of a cybernetic brain, one that is 
extended to various characters over the course of the novel. 
(Indeed, the title itself, in addition to being the phrase that one 
finds on a rental VCR cassette, also refers to using this pros-
thetic memory organ to keep from forgetting.) Beyond that 
image, Lucas foregrounds the role of “zapping” within the 
 consumerist logic that the character advances over the course of 
his section of the novel. This time, the mechanical brain is asso-
ciated with the reception of the televisual image rather than its 
production as was the case with the camera eyes of the first 
 passage. Now the video head is a receptive machine, a digital 
sampler that records a variety of images that are seen thanks to 
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the use of another machine—a remote control that exercises a 
cybernetic effect not only on his body but also on culture in 
general, especially if we take into account Sarlo’s analysis of 
 zapping. What unites the two descriptions, beyond the pros-
thetic brain, is the function that the organ performs. As both 
camera and digital sampler, the robot that lives inside Lucas 
remembers experiences by recording them and saving them to 
tape. The technological and artificial nature of these memories 
appears to be the result of their conversion into the organic 
 celluloid matrix that is Lucas’s brain.
If Lucas were the only metaphorical cyborg in the novel, we 
could use his particular conceptualization of posthuman iden-
tity as yet another support for the thesis that Christian 
Gundermann has presented about the very conservative posture 
he sees taken in the novel, especially when compared to the 
Argentine writer Manuel Puig. Lucas is presented as just one 
more “couch potato,” infected by the technology for which he 
feels an unhealthy attraction and identification. If we remember 
the cyborg trope in the traditional science fiction I mentioned, 
the standard version of the cyborg is the accidental and trau-
matic result of uncontrolled technophilia. Rather than exercise 
the subversive possibilities that Haraway has argued as inherent 
to the cyborg this traditional science fiction figure is a caution-
ary tale, a victim of the scientific hubris of Doctor Frankenstein—a 
warning to those who would disregard the limits on creation 
imposed by the divine. Even the AI robots and machines of the 
Terminator films, of the Matrix, or even the recent remake of 
Battlestar Galactica are threats to humanity because human 
pride in technology produced robots that were too good at 
what they did. The cyborg that Fuguet describes, however, does 
not fit within this model so easily and not merely because it is 
not a literal creation of metal and flesh. Lucas is a metaphorical 
cyborg that does not function as designed. He is a broken robot, 
so to speak. Note what the character expresses as he speaks of 
his own ability to remember, an ability supposedly facilitated by 
the prosthetic organ that we have discussed.
Lo único que tengo relativamente claro es que si no siento, si ya 
no me involucro en cosas que me importan, si ya no pueden 
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usarme como depositario de nada, no es del todo a propósito. 
Pero tampoco es una pose. O algo planeado. No es como si 
hubiera apretado un botón, todo se borró, y listo: adiós a mis 
sensaciones. Simplemente pasaron a mi lado, se fueron. A veces, 
incluso, trato de que vuelvan. Intento rebobinar, pero me es 
imposible. (29)
The only thing that I have relatively clear is that if I don’t feel, 
if I no longer involve myself in things that I care about, if they 
can no longer use me as a deposit of anything, it’s not com-
pletely on purpose. It’s not a pose either, or something planned. 
It’s not as though someone had pressed a button and everything 
was erased, goodbye to all my feelings. It’s just that everything 
passed by me, it’s gone. Sometimes, in fact, I try to make them 
come back. I try to rewind, but for me it’s impossible.
His inability to feel is connected, not with the insensitivity 
 stereotypically associated with those that watch too much tele-
vision and are isolated by that technology but with something 
very different. The button, that implement so important for a 
literal cyborg, does not receive the blame that Lucas assigns as 
he tries to understand his situation. The problem is that his 
electronic archive simply does not work. He is unable to rewind, 
unable to access the information that his prosthetic organ, be it 
camera or digital sampler, should have archived electronically. 
The problem from which Lucas suffers is not that he is a cyborg 
in a world of humans; it is that he is not cyborg enough, he is 
not able to use his electronic memory to access the past in the 
way that others supposedly can.
This vision of cyborg identity is developed in the title of 
Baltasar Daza’s novel, Daza being the pop novelist who appears 
at various points in Por favor, rebobinar. The title of his novel is, 
unoriginally, Disco Duro [Hard Disk], and Daza describes his 
novel in the following terms:
Es una idea, un juego. Es moderno, remite a los computadores 
y a los discos, o a los compacts, debería decir. Y lo duro, lo 
heavy, tiene que ver con la agresión y las drogas. Pero, más que 
nada, tiene que ver con nuestra memoria colectiva, con nuestro 
inconsciente, con aquello que tenemos insertado en el cerebro y 
no podemos borrar. (264)
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It’s an idea, a game. It is modern and it evokes Computers and 
disks, compact discs, I should say. And the hard, the heavy, has 
to do with aggression and drugs. But, more than anything, it 
has to do with our collective memory, with our unconscious, 
with that which we have inserted in our brains and that we can’t 
erase.
What Daza postulates is a cybernetic condition that extends 
throughout human identity, a situation in which the only way 
to conceive of a collective memory is through technology. Lucas 
is, then, one more cyborg among a generation of posthuman 
beings, his prosthetic organ simply does not function like the 
rest of his generation. In this sense, the parasitical relationship 
that Lucas has with film impedes his function as a posthuman 
rather than facilitating it. In so doing, Fuguet articulates an 
innovative vision of identity quite far afield of the typical neo-
luddite reaction of the conservative stance.
Andoni Llovet’s long chapter develops Daza’s vision second-
hand (the model and aspiring writer reports on Daza’s novel in 
its embryonic form over the course of his own autobiography). 
Throughout the chapter Llovet revisits the title of Daza’s 
 masterpiece, relaying Daza’s own views on “Disco Duro” even 
as he adapts and expands it to fuel his own thought on the 
 subconscious and on the artistic process. Llovet first mentions 
the novel as a long-promised text that has yet to appear, one 
that Daza mentions to his friends from writing classes but will 
not let them read:
Ése va a ser el epígrafe Disco Duro, la gran novela de Baltasar 
Daza. Caída libre es uno de los temas de Pascal Barros. Es el 
tema favorito de Baltasar. Daza lleva años trabajando en Disco 
Duro, pero nunca le ha mostrado nada a nadie. Sí ha contado 
cosas. Va a ser, se supone, su trabajo más autobiográfico y toma 
como punto de partida su familia.
—Quiero hacer una saga, pero sin caer en la fórmula del  realismo 
mágico. Puro realismo virtual, pura literatura McOndo. Algo 
así como La casa de los espíritus sin los espíritus. (145)
That will be the epigraph of Hard Disk, Baltasar Daza’s great 
novel. Free Fall was one of Pascal Barros’s songs. Baltasar’s 
favorite song. Daza has spent years working on Hard Disk but 
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he’s never shown any of it to anyone. He has told some of it. It’s 
going be, one assumes, his most autobiographical work and it 
takes his family as a starting point.
—I want to do a saga, but without recurring to the formula of 
magical realism. Pure virtual realism, pure McOndo literature. 
Something like The House of the Spirits without the spirits.
The novel serves as an example of Fuguet’s McOndo group, 
with emphasis on the rejection of magical realism as well as the 
sacred writers of the Chilean canon. The phrase that most 
attracts our attention, especially considering the title’s later 
posthuman implications, is “realismo virtual,” referring to 
Daza’s attempt to distance his work from Allende’s as well as 
the international market’s view of what Latin American litera-
ture should be. With the phrase virtual realism, we see a new 
vision of literature constructed that associates it with virtual 
reality worlds. In that sense not only does the literary act antic-
ipate the virtual computer worlds that we would later see so well 
explored in Edmundo Paz Soldán’s work, but Fuguet suggests 
that there is no distinction—that the literary virtual and the 
technological virtual are ultimately the same. In that sense the 
novel’s title not only suggests a way for thinking about posthu-
man memory but also a way to conceive of the entire artistic 
process.
In this same passage, Llovet reports further on Daza’s view 
of the virtual nature of the artistic process,
Este apoyo, más el contrato con una editorial y la ayuda de una 
agente, me daría el suficiente ánimo y seguridad para sacar de 
mi disco duro cerebral un montón de materia prima disponible 
con la cual lanzarme a escribir todas esas novelas que nadie, por 
cobarde o mediocre, ha tenido la ocurrencia de escribir. (146)
This support, plus the contract with the press and the help of an 
agent, will give me the needed will and security to access from 
my own cerebral hard disk a ton of available original material 
with which I can begin writing all the novels that no one, 
because they’re cowards or mediocre, has been able to write.
Here Daza links not only the artistic product with virtual 
 realities, but also the process of literary production with cyborg 
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embodiment. The business aspect of literature, invoked by the 
agent and the contract, become the market keys to the techno-
logical organ of creativity that resides within Daza’s cerebrum. 
This fusion of art, business, and the metaphor of the posthu-
man body creates a posthuman reality in which the cybernetic 
is a state to which artists aspire, a state from which Lucas finds 
himself isolated because his organs do not function properly.
Llovet continues in this mode later in his narrative as he 
 continues to muse on the creative process,
¿De dónde salió esto? Ni siquiera me acordaba de que tenía todo 
esto adentro, guardado, escondido.
¿Escondido?
Rebobinado.
Así que esto es lo que llaman inconsciente, ¿ah?
Me acuerdo que una vez leí en un New York Review of Books que 
tenía Balta un largo artículo sobre creatividad, rockeros y drog-
adicción. Algo así. Estaba basado en Jung, el psiquiatra favorito 
de Sting, que lo puso de moda con Synchronicity. Esta infor-
mación inútil la aportó Gonzalo McClure. El asunto es que el 
artículo analizaba y exploraba el por qué un tipo—un artista, 
más bien—crea. Compone, escribe letras, qué sé yo. La 
 conclusión final era que la creatividad salía del inconsciente. 
Nada nuevo ahí. Lo interesante, lo que a mí más me llamó la 
atención y aterró, fue la definición que el tal Jung le daba al 
inconciente. Según él, es todo lo que sabemos pero que no 
 estamos pensando. (1999: 172)
Where did this come from? I don’t even remember that I had all 
this inside, kept safe and hidden.
Hidden?
Rewound.
So that’s what they call the unconscious, right?
I remember that one time I read an article in a New York Review 
of Books that Balta had about creativity, rock musicians, and 
addiction. Something like that. It was based on Jung, Sting’s 
favorite  psychiatrist, that he made fashionable with Synchronicity. 
This useless information was given by Gonzalo McClure. The 
idea was that the article analyzed and explored why a guy—an 
artist rather, creates. He composes, writes  lyrics, whatever. The 
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final conclusion was that creativity came from the unconscious. 
Nothing new there. What was interesting, what caught my 
attention and scared me was the definition Jung gave of the 
unconscious. According to him, it is everything that we know 
but that we are not thinking.
Llovet’s discussion of Jung and the role of the unconscious is 
rather basic; he is, after all, merely processing what he read in 
the newspaper. What is telling is the fact that his access to the 
artistic subconscious is controlled by the word “Rebobinado.” 
Fuguet underscores this with the very layout of the writing. 
The telegraphic style of the beginning of the passage repro-
duces the breaks in movements that the act of rewinding 
 presupposes. Hence, not only does Llovet invoke “Rebobinar” 
but the text’s structure also invokes the action. Fuguet then 
accompanies this structural evocation with a memory; Llovet’s 
memory functioning now that he has been rewound.
The culmination of Llovet’s musings on Jung, Sting, and the 
subconscious makes the posthuman elements of the process 
even more clear:
O sea, es todo aquello de lo que alguna vez tuvimos conciencia, 
pero ya se nos olvidó. Algo así como el disco duro de los 
 computadores. El disco duro que todos llevamos dentro,  seamos 
compatibles o no. La luz se te puede cortar, te pueden robar el 
Mac, un virus te atacó, da lo mismo, tu disco duro sigue  adentro, 
contigo, vayas donde vayas, hagas lo que hagas. (172)
That is, it is everything of which we were once conscious, but 
that we have since forgotten. Something like the hard disk of 
computers. The hard disk that we all have inside, whether we’re 
compatible or not. The electricity can go out, they can steal 
your Mac, you can get a virus, it doesn’t matter, your hard disk 
continues inside, wherever you go, whatever you do.
Llovet, then, as a being that must be rewound, can only find 
the vocabulary to describe the human condition in computers. 
And yet the metaphor of the hard drive does not suggest a 
 situation in which the organic is completely replaced by the 
technological. Humans are not better off as robots. Llovet’s 
human hard drive improves on the purely mechanical original 
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in that it cannot be stolen, it cannot be erased by a power 
 outage, and it is impervious to computer viruses. What we see 
proposed here is the posthuman as the condition that solves 
both organic shortcomings and technological drawbacks.
Fuguet strengthens this interpretation with a series of meta-
phors that develops posthuman identities as various characters. 
In a specific chain of cybernetic images, we see the description 
of the city as a technological body. “En el city hay de todo, 
como una radio interna propia y un sistema de videos las 24 
horas, que funciona por room service y que sólo se especializa 
en cintas raras, de culto (seleccionadas por el joven crítico Lucas 
García)” (232) [In the city there is a bit of everything, like one’s 
own internal radio and a 24-hour video system, that works by 
room service and specializes only in rare, cult tapes (selected by 
the young critic Lucas García)]. Urban identity is transformed 
here in a network of interrelated machines. Moreover, the archi-
val and surveillance functions of this machine city create a direct 
connection with Lucas’s cyborg body. This particular combina-
tion of technology and surveillance situates Fuguet’s cyborg 
city alongside that proposed by Jesús Martín Barbero:
[es un] mareamiento de circuitos y trayectos que de-velan en las 
cibernéticas metrópolis actuales de ciudades invisibles: místicas, 
esotéricas, vivenciales. Y desde las cartografías catastrales 
 construidas desde arriba, y a las que “nada escapa” como el 
panóptico aquel que estudiara Foucault, sólo que ahora su  centro 
es móvil—la cámara colocada en el helicóptero—. (2003: 13)
[It is a] dizzying collection of circuits and trajectories that is 
uncovered in the real cybernetic metropolises of invisible cities, 
mystics, esoteric and filled with life. And it is from the maps 
constructed from above and that nothing escapes like the 
Panopticon that Foucault studied, though now the center is 
mobile, the camera is in the helicopter.
The perspective that Fuguet contributes to this articulation of 
the city is the way in which the body of the posthuman being 
becomes the map of the cybernetic metropolis, the fusion of 
flesh and prosthesis as an exact replica of what is found in the 
cities that Martín Barbero describes. In fact, Fuguet expresses 
the connection between body and city explicitly when he 
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writes: “Las calles de la ciudad son tus arterias, en los parques 
se esconde tu pasado y entre los sitios baldíos se reparte tu cora-
zón” (229–30) [The streets of the city or your arteries, your 
past hides in the parks and your heart in the places]. In this 
statement, we see the way in which the organic elements of the 
body function as a map of the streets. This combines with the 
earlier passage in which places in the city employ a surveillance 
technology that evokes specifically the mechanical brain that 
Lucas describes and to which he alludes constantly with his 
references to a “rewinding” memory.
The novel ends with the chapter, “Gonzalo McClure: Adulto 
contemporáneo.” McClure, half of a couple that is expecting 
their first child, reflects on the past that he shared with several 
of the characters who have told their stories over the course of 
the novel as he simultaneously distances himself from them with 
the formation of a “traditional” relationship (i.e., heterosexual, 
monogamous, with children). Gundermann highlights, obvi-
ously, this as clear evidence of the conservative vision that Fuguet 
develops over the course of the novel. As I mentioned previously, 
Gundermann has a basis for his argument, especially if we view 
Lucas as an infected couch potato. In fact, McClure mentions 
one character, the famous musician/actor Pascal Barros, in a 
situation that suggests that he has successfully abandoned a 
cybernetic aesthetic: “Pascal no toca en vivo hace tiempo. Ahora 
está abocado a grabar su nuevo disco: Perdidos, interferidos, 
desenchufados. Es, claro, un disco acústico, unplugged. Tiene 
más de veinte temas listos” (383) [Pascal hasn’t played live for a 
while now. He’s recording a new record: Lost, interfered, with 
and unplugged. It is, of course, an acoustic disk, unplugged. He 
has more than twenty songs ready]. After so many “plugged-in” 
bodies the fact that Barros is now playing acoustic music sug-
gests a certain de-evolution, at least in posthuman terms. That 
noted, Lucas is not actually a couch potato infected by technol-
ogy, he is the result of broken prostheses and, within that logic, 
Fuguet creates a continuity between the ubiquitous posthuman-
ity in the early part of the novel and a continued cybernetic 
discourse in this rather  nostalgic denouement. McClure notes 
that his prosthetic  memory organ continues to function: “Sólo 
el pasado, con sus hechos y sus recuerdos, podrá esclarecer lo 
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que hoy nos parece tan enredado y oscuro. Quizás. Pero entiendo 
a los que se niegan a rebobinar hacia cualquier lado” (380) [Only 
the past, with its facts and memories, can clear up what today 
seems so twisted and dark. Maybe. But I can understand those 
that refuse to rewind toward any side]. The fact that the act of 
remembering continues to be expressed in terms of rewinding 
suggests that this particular aspect of the posthuman condition 
endures, in spite of the evolution of the postadolescents that 
populate the narrative.
Indeed, the arrival of a child at the end of the novel can be 
seen within this ongoing exaltation of posthuman identity. 
McClure is careful to discuss at length his work and his wife’s; 
he in radio, she as a former model, now photographer. In both 
professions, we see a particular relationship between technol-
ogy and the body. McClure and the other characters who work 
in radio comment several times on the displacing effect of the 
decorporealized voices that are an essential part of any radio 
personality. Their relationship with the mass media has let 
them, to borrow a phrase from cyberpunk, move away from the 
meat of the body and toward mass conversation with their 
 listeners. When we combine that with the posthuman discourse 
of the novel, we see McClure as yet another articulation of the 
changing relationship between bodies and technology that 
occur in the realm of the mass media. Importantly, Pía, 
McClure’s wife, also works in the production of image, in the 
conversion of body into photograph, much as we saw in the 
novels of Paz Soldán and Prado. Moreover, Pía has moved from 
one side of the camera to the other as she changes professions, 
creating a situation in which she always appears defined by the 
camera, but ending in a place where the camera functions as her 
prosthetic eye rather than one in which she offers her body up 
to the consuming gaze of the lens. That these two would pro-
create, then, suggests the arrival of an audiovisual child that 
combines the professions of both parents. The conservative 
ending that Gundermann dismisses is also the arrival of a new 
kind of posthuman, one that combines both mass media tech-
nology with a heteronormative nuclear family.2
In Fuguet’s subsequent fiction, we see a more detailed 
 exploration of the intersections of technology and the  formation 
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of “traditional” families. The story “Hijos” [Children], from 
his 2005 collection, Cortos [Shorts], displays just such an exam-
ple where Fuguet examines the dynamics of parenthood implicit 
in the relationship a married couple has with their computers. 
The story follows the lives of a couple in their late twenties, 
content with their childless life. Over the course of the narra-
tive, they meet an elderly couple, also childless, and become 
friends with them, sharing films and giving them a Macintosh 
laptop. The elderly couple receives the gift with some trepida-
tion, and then enjoys what it has to offer—the elderly man being 
a film scholar who is amazed with all that the Internet Movie 
Database (www.imdb.com) has to offer. The story ends unre-
markably, the elderly couple’s cat passes away and life continues. 
Fuguet structures the story in chapters with sections, the 
 chapter numbers appearing in the screen of a laptop that appears 
at the top of the page, the sections divided by Apple Computer’s 
trademark .
The posthuman nature of the story again functions on an 
implicit level (aside from the ubiquitous references to Macintosh), 
underpinning much of the younger couple’s relationship even as 
it begins to suggest ways to understand the relationship between 
film and interpersonal relationships. Near the beginning of the 
story, the narrator describes his relationship with his wife Carla.
Somos una pareja joven, sin hijos. Lo de joven es relativo. 
Ninguno de los dos ha cumplido los treinta, es cierto, pero 
 llevamos siete años juntos y no hemos sentido comezón algún. 
Diría que somos más ambient que transient . . . 
Nos gusta surfear la red tomados de la mano. Tenemos un com-
putador al lado del otro. Recientemente pasamos a banda ancha. 
Contamos con varios Apple. Los coleccionamos. Es donde más 
gastamos, pero nos parece más una inversión que un despilfarro. 
Nos gusta renovarlos cada tres años. . . . A veces le envío emails 
cariñosos y le escribo el tipo de cosas que no me atrevo a decirle 
en persona. A ella le gusta tomar fotos digitales a cosas en las 
que nadie se fija: vitrinas, letreros, carteleras de cine. Cuando no 
podemos estar juntos, chateamos vía Messenger. (117)
We’re a young couple with no children. But being “young” is 
relative. It’s true neither of us has turned thirty yet, but we’ve 
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been together for seven years and haven’t felt any real itching 
desire to start a family. I’d say we’re more ambient than tran-
sient. . . . We like to hold hands while surfing the net, which is 
why we’ve got our computers set up next to each other. We 
recently went to broadband, and use several Apple products. We 
collect them. It’s where much of our budget goes, but we look 
at it as more of an investment than a waste. We like upgrading 
every three years. . . . Sometimes I’ll send her affectionate emails 
in which I describe things that I’d never dare to reveal in  person. 
She likes to snap digital photos of things that people usually 
overlook: display cabinets, billboards, cinema marquees. When 
we can’t be together, we chat over Instant Messenger. (125)
Clearly what makes the couple remarkable is the extent to which 
the Macintosh computers mediate their relationship. Email and 
chats provide a virtual intimacy at times more direct than that 
which they enjoy when physically together. The image of the 
two holding hands as they surf the Internet is particularly pow-
erful as it not only displays Katherine Hayles’s image of the 
posthuman computer user but it combines that with the inter-
personal dynamics of a married couple. Fuguet produces a kind 
of triad in which the human couple commune with each other 
even as they fuse with the Internet through their laptops. For 
that reason, it should not surprise us that they renew their com-
puters every three years. Fuguet’s image of human/human/
computer fusion naturally would produce metaphorical  children; 
in this case, the updated PowerBooks.
As the younger couple befriends an elderly film professor and 
his wife, Fuguet begins to use elements of film theory as an 
engine for the exploration of interpersonal dynamics in an age 
of computers and cinema. In one scene that occurs near the 
beginning of the friendship, we see the beginning of this 
 theorization,
Un par de semanas atrás, el doctor nos mostró una vejada copia 
en 16 mm de El acorazado Potemkin. Si bien el curso no incluía 
cine ruso, Paternostro Villalba usó la obra de Eisenstein para 
ilustrarnos dos ideas que, para él, son claves: el montaje como 
instrumento revolucionario y el cine como manifiesto. La 
famosa escena de las escaleras de Odessa me recordó la secuencia 
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en la estación de tren de Chicago de Los Intocables con Kevin 
Costner. Se lo hice saber. Paternostro no sabía de qué hablaba. 
Tampoco conocía, ni de referencia, el trabajo de Brian De Palma. 
(121–22)
Two weeks ago, the professor showed us an old 16mm copy of 
Battleship Potemkin. Though the syllabus didn’t include any 
Russian films, Paternostro Villalba used Eisentstein’s work to 
illustrate two ideas he felt were crucial: the use of cinema as a 
revolutionary instrument, and cinema as manifesto. The famous 
scene on the steps leading to the Odessa harbor immediately 
reminded me of the Chicago train station sequence in The 
Untouchables with Kevin Costner. I pointed out the  connection, 
but Paternostro didn’t know what I was talking about. He didn’t 
know—nor had he heard of—Brian De Palma’s work. (130)
Eisenstein’s appearance in the story advances the theme of an 
implicit posthumanity in a way similar to the concept of post-
human cleavage that I introduced in chapter 3 of this book. 
That is, Eisenstein here functions as a metonymy of his theories 
on cinema and montage, specifically on the unique importance 
of editing in a cinematic aesthetic. Eisenstein’s insistence on the 
power of the cut in the creation of meaning becomes a meta-
phor for Fuguet’s thinking on the ways in which humans join 
together in interpersonal relationships.
The narrator’s response to the class is instructive, as is 
Paternostro’s use of Eisenstein as an example in a class not 
explicitly about Russian film. Paternostro introduces Eisenstein 
as a foreign element, as an edited-in sequence that alters the 
meaning of the course by highlighting the revolutionary poten-
tial of montage. The narrator then repeats this move, using the 
Eisenstein sequence in conjunction with his own cinematic 
background, the more contemporary De Palma film, The 
Untouchables. The narrator has performed an Eisensteinian 
operation in which an editing-in of the subsequent film enriches 
the Eisenstein original, an idiosyncratic move certainly as the 
De Palma film was clearly referencing Eisenstein. This series of 
cinematic moves in a collection of short stories titled Cortos in 
Spanish emphasizes not only the cinematic aesthetic that Fuguet 
develops in the short stories, but also opens up the possibility of 
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thinking of the shorts as a montage, as a series of cleavages that 
produce meaning at the seam of the cut.
The subsequent development of the story shows how this 
logic then controls both the structure and the thematics that 
continue. The shared interest in cinema brings the younger and 
older couples together; the younger couple gives the Paternostros 
an old laptop and the lives of all four begin to change. The 
 editing together of the generations produces alterations in 
meaning even as it suggests a way to understand the relation-
ship of technology with the lives of the characters. That is, just 
as these lives are joined through cinematic cuts, the relation-
ships between bodies are joined at sutures forged by computers. 
Here we return to the image of the younger couple surfing the 
web and holding hands, but also to the Apple trademarks that 
divide and join the sections of the story. Fuguet’s achievement 
in the story is, then, not so much in the story of two couples 
whose lives are changed by one another, but in the way in which 
he uses cinematic aesthetics and an implicit posthuman context 
to narrate what is ultimately a Hollywood feel-good story.
Fuguet’s narrative provides a vision of posthuman life much 
more radical than one would expect and in a much more subtle 
way than one sees in posthuman literature, certainly more sub-
tle than Fresán. Without any science fiction figures, no robots, 
androids, or kids with Mantra-vision, Fuguet constructs a world 
in which technology permeates and penetrates every character, 
reconfiguring its auto-discursive strategies in such a way that 
they cannot articulate their own identities without depending 
on technological imagery. It may be that these figures do not 
achieve the subversive ends that Haraway dreams for her 
cyborgs, but they do present a markedly different cultural  reality 
in which posthuman identity has become a fact of the everyday 
world.
The McOndo writers have been criticized, extensively, for 
their perceived lack of political engagement. My analysis here 
certainly does not do anything to defend them from that criti-
cism. Indeed, what we see in the posthumans that wander 
through Fresán and Fuguet’s novels do not perform the same 
kind of political and social critiques that we see in other Latin 
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American novels. We do not see Piglia’s traumatized cyborg 
whose prostheses tell the story of state torture, we do not see 
the cybernetic products of neoliberalism run amok that Paz 
Soldán and Courtoisie describe in their recent novels, nor do we 
see explorations of gender and sexuality that appear in novels by 
Borinsky, Boullosa, and Prado and that engage more directly 
North American and European cultural theory. What we see is 
the construction of narrative realities where posthuman  identity 
is a given, a quotidian condition of a shared experience. The 
link to memory that we see in both novels becomes not the 
attempt to remember a traumatic past or to recoup a pretechno-
logical world; what we see is the need to construct a new  history, 
a new mythology in which the posthuman finds its forebears in 
the machines that helped make them.
